At this point, this is simply a matter of probability principle
By replacing within the (1), i have:

That it illustration of Bayes‘ Theorem deals with the straightforward circumstances in which you have several hypotheses H and you will J which might be collectively personal and you may as you thorough, and you will in which one is looking for \(\Pr(H \middle E)\), which is, the probability one to H holds true given evidence Age. What that it exemplory case of Bayes‘ Theorem does was promote one to having a way of calculating one probability, so long as one knows, firstly, \(\Pr(H)\) and \(\Pr(J)\)-that’s, the newest a great priori analytical possibilities of \(H\) and you may \(J\)-and have now, next, \(\Pr(Elizabeth \middle H)\) and you may \(\Pr(Age \mid J)\)-which is, new logical probability of \(E\) considering, respectively, simply \(H\) and just \(J\).
Nevertheless now Draper introduces a couple substantive claims. The very first is that the an excellent priori likelihood of the newest theory of apathy is not below the a good priori likelihood of theism, in order for i’ve